Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/8914
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| Title: | A Characterization of Sequential Rationalizability |
| Authors: | Apesteguía, José
Ballester, Miguel Ángel |
| Other authors: | Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
| Subjects: | Individual rationality, Rationalizability, Consistency, Bounded rationality, Behavioral economics, Voting |
| Creation Date: | May-2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1089 |
| Abstract: | A choice function is sequentially rationalizable if there is an ordered collection of asymmetric binary relations that identifies the selected alternative in every choice problem. We propose a property, F-consistency, and show that it characterizes the notion of sequential rationalizability. F-consistency is a testable property that highlights the behavioral aspects implicit in sequentially rationalizable choice. Further, our characterization result provides a novel tool with which to study how other behavioral concepts are related to sequential rationalizability, and establish a priori unexpected implications. In particular, we show that the concept of rationalizability by game trees, which, in principle, had little to do with sequential rationalizability, is a refinement of the latter. Every choice function that is rationalizable by a game tree is also sequentially rationalizable. Finally, we show that some prominent voting mechanisms are also sequentially rationalizable. |
| Appears in Collections: | Economics and Business Working Papers Series
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