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On equilibria in duopolies with finite strategy spaces
Talluri, Kalyan
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if startingfrom any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves weare able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterizationof all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. Wedescribe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.
Statistics, Econometrics and Quantitative Methods
revenue management
discrete-choice theory
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