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Title:
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Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict
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Author:
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Esteban, Joan M.; Sákovics, József
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Other authors:
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Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
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Abstract:
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We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and in case they win later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect. |
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Publication date:
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2005-09-15 |
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Subject(s):
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Coalition formation, conflict, alliance |
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Rights:
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Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
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Document type:
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Working Paper |
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