|
Title:
|
On Forward Induction and Evolutionary and Strategic Stability
|
|
Author:
|
Hauk, Esther; Hurkens, Sjaak
|
|
Other authors:
|
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
|
Abstract:
|
We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion of forward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the class of generic two player normal form games preceded by an outside option. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts (including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction. |
|
Publication date:
|
2005-09-15 |
|
Subject(s):
|
Forward induction, strategic stability, EES sets, index theory |
|
Rights:
|
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
|
Document type:
|
Working Paper |
|
Share:
|
|
