Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/5368
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| Title: | All-pay auction equilibria in contests |
| Authors: | Alcalde, José
Dahm, Matthias |
| Other authors: | Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
| Subjects: | Subhastes
Política
Models economètrics
Renda (Teoria econòmica)
Eleccions
Jocs, Teoria de |
| Creation Date: | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2008-04 |
| Abstract: | We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions.
There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the
prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction.
Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of
this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application
of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent-
seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing
returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with
or without a common value.
Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions.
JEL Classification Numbers:
C72 (Noncooperative Games),
D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections),
D44 (Auctions). |
| CDU: | 338 - Economic situation. Trade cycle. Development of economic structure. Growth |
| Appears in Collections: | Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia
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| DT.2008-4-.PDF | | 451Kb | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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