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The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach
Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Rafels, Carles
Universitat de Barcelona
This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominatedimputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms alsocharacterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balancedgames, and superadditive games
Aquest article proporciona un marc axiomàtic per a comparar el Cor de d (el joc d'imputacions indominades) i el cor d'un joc cooperatiu amb la utilitat trasferible. El teorema 1 estats que el Cor de d és l'única solució que satisfà la consistència de projecció, el raonable (des de dalt), (*)-*antimonotonicity, i la *modularitat. El teorema 2 caracteritza el substituir de cor (*)-*antimonotonicity per *antimonotonicity. A més, aquests axiomes també caracteritzen el cor sobre el domini de jocs convexs, jocs totalment equilibrats, jocs equilibrats, i jocs superadditius.
2010-05-04
Teoria de jocs
Game theory
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Llerena et al., 2005
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Working Paper
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
         

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