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Decentralization and the Gains from Monitoring
Theilen, Bernd
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
This paper analyzes the delegation of contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment with sequential production in a project which involves a principal and two agents. The agent in charge of the …nal production can obtain soft information about the other agent's effort choice by investing in monitoring. I investigate the circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to use a centralized organization in which she designs the contracts with both agents or to use a decentralized organization in which she contracts only one agent, and delegates the power to contract the other agent. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized organization can be superior to a centralized organization. This is because the principal is better off under monitoring and the incentives for an agent to invest in monitoring can be higher in a decentralized organization. The circumstances under which this is true are related to the monitoring costs and the importance of each agent for production. The results explain the recent application of the design-build method in public procurement. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Decentralization of Contracting, Monitoring, Moral Hazard.
2009
65 - Gestió i organització. Administració i direcció d'empreses. Publicitat. Relacions públiques. Mitjans de comunicació de masses
Conducta organitzacional
Contractació externa
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Working Paper
1988 - 0812
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2009-08
         

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