To access the full text documents, please follow this link: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/12035

The proportional coalitional Shapley value
Alonso Meijide, José María; Carreras Escobar, Francisco
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada II; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The resulting coalitional value is a twofold extension of the Shapley value in the following sense: (1) the amount obtained by any union coincides with the Shapley value of the union in the quotient game; and (2) the players of the union share this amount proportionally to their Shapley value in the original game (i.e., without unions). We provide axiomatic characterizations of this value close to those existing in the literature for the Owen value and include applications to coalition formation in bankruptcy and voting problems.
Peer Reviewed
Postprint (published version)
2012-05-11
Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Matemàtica aplicada a les ciències
Game theory--Mathematical models
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Jocs, Teoria de -- Models matemàtics
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
Restricted access - publisher's policy
Article
         

Show full item record

 

Coordination

 

Supporters