Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/1872

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; Oviedo, Jorge
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.
2006-05-09
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Working Paper
Working papers; 577.03
         

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